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QQSI GROUP

QUALITATIVE

QUANTITATIVE

STRATEGIC

INTELLIGENCE

The Normalization of American Unreliability

On August 25, a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster flew from Riga, Latvia, directly to Moscow. The aircraft’s purpose was not publicly explained. On the same day, Reuters confirmed that CIA Director John Ratcliffe was in Moscow for undisclosed meetings with Russian officials, the first visit to Russia by a serving CIA director since William Burns traveled there in November 2021, shortly before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[1][2]

There is nothing inherently improper about either event. The United States should maintain channels of communication with Russia, particularly when relations between nuclear powers are strained and when Russia remains engaged in the largest European land war since 1945. Intelligence services communicate with adversaries for reasons ranging from deconfliction and prisoner issues to intelligence exchanges and crisis management. There may ultimately be a perfectly legitimate explanation for Ratcliffe’s meetings and for the military aircraft traveling from a NATO capital to Moscow.

What is remarkable is that the presumption of benign American intent can no longer be taken for granted. An equally plausible initial reaction is to ask what Washington is negotiating, whether European governments were consulted, whether Ukraine knew, and whether some broader agreement is being pursued at their expense. There is presently no public evidence that Ratcliffe was acting against NATO or European interests. The fact that such a suspicion nevertheless sounds reasonable is itself important. In a high-trust relationship, ambiguity is cushioned by credibility; the benefit of the doubt fills whatever information is missing. Once credibility has deteriorated, the same ambiguity invites suspicion.

That distinction has become increasingly important in thinking about the United States and its relationships with allies and adversaries. The issue is not simply whether American foreign policy has changed under Donald Trump. Foreign policy should change when circumstances require it, and presidents are elected in part to pursue different policies. The larger issue is whether repeated departures from previously understood standards of American behavior have accumulated to the point that unpredictability and conditionality are no longer regarded as deviations at all. They are increasingly treated as features of the system.

The concept that best describes this process comes not from international relations but from organizational sociology. Diane Vaughan developed the idea of the “normalization of deviance” in her study of the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster. NASA had previously observed abnormal behavior in the shuttle’s solid rocket booster O-rings. Those abnormalities did not initially produce catastrophe. Missions flew, the shuttles returned, and repeated exposure to a known deviation gradually changed how the organization understood the danger. What should have remained an unacceptable departure from design expectations became tolerable because previous deviations had apparently been survived.[3]

Normalization of deviance is therefore more subtle than simple rule-breaking. It describes a movement in the baseline itself. Something previously considered abnormal occurs, the anticipated disaster does not immediately follow, and the system adapts. The behavior is repeated, people become accustomed to it, and eventually the deviation is no longer perceived as especially deviant. The extraordinary becomes controversial, the controversial becomes familiar, and the familiar eventually becomes normal.

This framework is useful in understanding what has happened to American credibility because the deterioration has not occurred through a single catastrophic breach. It has been cumulative. Commitments become conditional. Policies are abruptly reversed. Allies are threatened over issues unrelated to the underlying alliance. Security and economic relationships become increasingly transactional. Senior officials contradict one another. Agreements that appear durable become vulnerable to the next dispute or election. Any individual decision may have a defensible rationale, but other governments do not experience them as isolated events. They observe the pattern and adjust their expectations accordingly.

This matters because power and credibility are different strategic assets. The United States remains extraordinarily powerful. Its military capabilities, nuclear arsenal, financial system, technological base, intelligence relationships, diplomatic reach, and alliance network give Washington capacities that no other country possesses in combination. None of that guarantees that another government believes an American statement.

Power answers whether the United States can do something. Credibility answers whether another actor believes it will. Trust goes further: it determines whether another government can safely organize its own behavior around an American promise. A country does not get to award credibility to itself. Credibility exists in the judgment of the audience, and that judgment is formed from accumulated behavior.

There is evidence that this judgment has shifted significantly. Pew Research Center surveyed 42,151 adults in 36 countries between February and May 2026. In eight of the ten European countries surveyed, a majority no longer regarded the United States as a reliable partner. Hungary and Poland were the only two where majorities still described the United States as reliable. In the other eight countries, the share describing America as reliable had fallen by between 28 and 52 percentage points compared with earlier polling.[4] Public opinion is not identical to government policy, but a decline of that magnitude across multiple allied countries is difficult to dismiss as a temporary fluctuation.

For much of the postwar era, American commitments carried a substantial presumption of reliability. That did not mean allied governments believed everything Washington said. American history contains broken promises, failed policies, strategic misjudgments, and abrupt changes under presidents of both parties. Allies have always protected their own interests and verified American claims. Yet the starting position generally remained that a formal American commitment was consequential.

The familiar formulation was “trust, but verify.” The emerging environment increasingly appears to reverse the sequence. Before organizing national policy around an American commitment, another government may now reasonably ask whether the statement actually represents policy, whether another senior official will contradict it, whether an unrelated dispute will alter it, whether the commitment will survive domestic political pressure, and whether it will remain valid after the next election. Verification increasingly precedes trust. The burden has shifted toward a simpler requirement: prove it.

NATO is where that change is potentially most dangerous. At the July 2026 summit in Ankara, all 32 members reaffirmed what they called an “ironclad commitment” to Article 5 and repeated the foundational proposition that an attack on one ally is an attack on all.[5] The alliance remains militarily formidable, European members have sharply increased defense spending, and there is no factual basis for stating that the United States has formally abandoned its collective-defense obligations.

At the same time, Trump has repeatedly introduced doubt about whether those obligations are unconditional. In March 2025 he said directly that if NATO members did not spend enough on defense, “I’m not going to defend them.”[6] The significance of that statement is not that it proves what the United States would do during an actual Russian attack. It is that a formal reaffirmation of Article 5 and a presidential declaration that defense may be conditional now coexist as part of the same American record.

Force posture adds another layer. In May 2026, the Pentagon halted a planned deployment of roughly 4,000 troops from the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, to Poland. Soldiers and equipment had already begun arriving when the movement was stopped. The broader policy involved reducing one of four U.S. brigade combat teams in Europe and shifting greater responsibility for conventional defense to European allies.[7][8] There are legitimate arguments for such burden-sharing. Europe can and should assume more responsibility for its own defense, and the removal of an American brigade does not equal abandonment of NATO.

The credibility issue comes from accumulation rather than any single decision. A president questions whether some allies will be defended, planned deployments to NATO’s eastern flank are canceled, force levels are reduced, and European governments are told to prepare for greater strategic independence. Washington then reiterates that Article 5 remains ironclad. Each statement and action may be explicable on its own, but Moscow and allied capitals evaluate them together.

For deterrence, the relevant question is not whether anyone can prove that the United States would refuse to defend Poland. The problem is that the question can now be asked seriously. Twenty years ago, an unmistakable Russian attack on Poland was generally assumed to risk immediate confrontation with the United States because Poland was a NATO member. Today, the discussion can revolve around probabilities: whether Washington would respond immediately, whether it would debate the circumstances of the attack, whether Europeans would be expected to act first, or whether some other political dispute would influence the decision.

Vladimir Putin does not need certainty that the United States would abandon an ally for this uncertainty to matter. Deterrence operates through an adversary’s calculation of expected costs and risks. Even a modest reduction in confidence that the United States will act can make probing the alliance more attractive. In this sense, credibility is not merely reputational. It is part of the deterrent itself.

Canada illustrates the same phenomenon in a different domain. Trade disputes between the United States and Canada have existed for decades, including recurring disagreements over lumber, dairy, automobiles, and agricultural products. What is unusual is the scale and character of the current conflict. Washington has imposed tariffs of 50 percent on roughly $20 billion of Canadian goods, while Canada has announced retaliatory tariffs on hundreds of American products. The Associated Press now describes the situation straightforwardly as an escalating trade war between two economies that have been deeply integrated for generations.[9][10]

The immediate policy argument concerns whether American complaints about Canadian trade practices justify the tariffs. The strategic issue lies in what Canada learns from the experience. If economic integration with the United States can be converted into political leverage against Canada, reducing that dependence becomes a rational Canadian objective. Ottawa has incentives to develop alternative markets, diversify supply chains, and create greater economic redundancy. Even if the tariff dispute is eventually resolved, those adaptations may remain.

This is an important distinction because tactical success can coexist with strategic loss. Washington may eventually obtain concessions from Canada and regard the dispute as a negotiating victory. Canada may simultaneously conclude that it should never again permit itself to be as vulnerable to unilateral American pressure. Other allies will observe the same episode and draw their own conclusions. The tariff can disappear while the lesson survives.

The pattern extends into Asia. In August, the United States and South Korea agreed to sharply shorten and reduce the scope of their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises following Trump’s direction to scale back American participation. The eleven-day exercise was reduced to five days, with less field training. Reuters also reported that neither American nor South Korean officials had been briefed before Trump’s initial order.[11] These decisions have occurred while Trump pursues renewed diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, producing wider concern over how Washington intends to balance deterrence, negotiation, alliance management, and its other global military requirements.

Changing an exercise does not mean abandoning South Korea, and diplomacy with North Korea is not evidence of betrayal. The strategic issue again concerns the pattern of decision-making and what other governments infer from it. South Korea can remain firmly allied with the United States while increasing its ability to operate independently. Japan can maintain its alliance while reconsidering assumptions about American political continuity. Taiwan can value American support while simultaneously preparing for the possibility that Washington’s priorities may change. China observes all of those adaptations.

Iran demonstrates the same problem from the perspective of an adversary. The United States possesses vastly greater conventional military power than Iran, but military capability and strategic credibility are not synonymous. An adversary does not necessarily need to defeat American forces if it believes American political endurance is shorter than its own. If Tehran concludes that it can absorb punishment, preserve the regime and sufficient military capability, and wait for Washington’s priorities or leadership to change, then the lesson it draws from confrontation may not be the lesson America intended to teach.

Whether Iran’s assessment is correct is secondary to its strategic significance. Deterrence exists partly in the mind of the opponent. A government that believes American coercion comes with a political expiration date will behave differently from one that believes American commitments will endure regardless of electoral or political inconvenience. Russia, China, and North Korea can observe the same phenomenon without concluding that the United States is weak. They need only conclude that time may sometimes work in their favor.

Ukraine confronts the inverse problem. On August 25, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the present opportunity for American-mediated diplomacy as extending until the summer of 2027 and tied that window partly to the approaching 2028 U.S. presidential election.[12] A country fighting for its survival is therefore incorporating the American electoral cycle into its strategic calculations. That does not mean the United States has abandoned Ukraine. It demonstrates that American political continuity has itself become a variable that other governments must plan around.

These examples do not prove that Canada, Poland, South Korea, Ukraine, Iran, Russia, and China have reached the same conclusions. They have different interests and very different relationships with Washington. Some may overestimate American inconsistency or draw incorrect lessons from individual events. What matters is that all are observing American behavior and updating their assumptions accordingly. When those assumptions begin to influence trade diversification, defense procurement, alliance planning, military posture, diplomacy, and adversary risk calculations, credibility loss stops being an abstract reputational problem. It becomes strategy.

The United States can conceal this deterioration for a long time because its raw power remains so extensive. If a warning is not believed, Washington can impose sanctions. If sanctions prove insufficient, they can be expanded. If economic pressure fails, military forces can be moved. If an ally doubts American commitment, additional troops, weapons, or funding can be provided. A sufficiently powerful state can compensate for declining credibility by repeatedly demonstrating capability.

The danger lies in mistaking those demonstrations for evidence that nothing has been lost. Credibility makes power cheaper. If an adversary believes an American warning, the warning itself can shape behavior without the use of force. If an ally believes an American security guarantee, Washington does not need continually to prove that guarantee through new deployments and public assurances. If another country expects an agreement to survive political inconvenience, ordinary disputes do not require repeated coercion.

As credibility declines, the United States may have to spend more tangible power to produce effects that were once partly generated by expectation. There is no government accounting system capable of measuring this expenditure. Congress receives no annual estimate of how much credibility was consumed when Canada decided to diversify, when European governments began planning for reduced American participation, or when an adversary concluded that American political attention might eventually move elsewhere. The costs appear indirectly and often long after the original decision.

This delayed effect is exactly what makes normalization of deviance useful as an analytical framework. The immediate system does not collapse. NATO still exists. Canada remains deeply connected to the American economy. South Korea remains an ally. Iran remains under severe pressure. Russia has not attacked NATO. Because catastrophe does not follow each deviation, it is tempting to conclude that the underlying system remains healthy. Yet the absence of immediate failure does not demonstrate that nothing has changed.

Trust at the human level operates similarly. A serious breach in a relationship may be forgiven without restoring the previous level of trust. Once that trust has been damaged, explanations that were once accepted easily are evaluated differently. An apology may matter, but an apology does not recreate credibility. The only meaningful repair comes through repeated behavior over time, particularly when behaving consistently becomes inconvenient.

This is why the American credibility problem will outlast the policies or personalities that produced it. A future administration could remove tariffs, restore military exercises, redeploy forces, reaffirm NATO, and announce that the United States has returned to a more predictable foreign policy. Those actions could begin rebuilding trust, but they could not compel another government to forget what it has learned.

Allies and adversaries plan over periods much longer than a presidential term. Weapons programs take decades. Energy systems, industrial supply chains, and trade relationships are built over decades. Alliances are intended to survive generations. Other governments cannot responsibly reconstruct national strategy every four years on the assumption that the newest American president represents a permanent United States. Once American political discontinuity becomes part of their planning assumptions, reversing the underlying policy does not automatically erase the resulting behavior.

Hungary offers a useful domestic analogy. After years in which political and institutional norms were steadily altered, restoring confidence in those institutions cannot occur simply because laws change or officials are replaced. Citizens, investors, European institutions, and civil servants will judge whether reforms survive moments when respecting them becomes politically inconvenient. Trust destroyed through accumulated behavior has to be reconstructed through accumulated behavior.

The same standard eventually applies internationally. A future American president can declare that an alliance is permanent or that America is “back,” but the response from an ally that has already changed its assumptions may be less enthusiastic than Washington expects. The relevant question will not be whether the declaration sounds sincere. It will be whether American conduct repeatedly confirms it over time.

This is why the argument is ultimately larger than Donald Trump. Trump is central to the present period and has accelerated the shift through his approach to alliances, trade, diplomacy, and coercion. But the more consequential question concerns what other countries are learning about the United States and which of those lessons will remain after he is gone. Policies can change quickly. Strategic memory does not.

That brings the argument back to the unexplained American activity in Moscow. There may ultimately be an entirely legitimate reason for Ratcliffe’s meetings and for the military flight from Riga. The United States may be pursuing an objective that benefits NATO, Ukraine, or European security. Nothing presently available justifies claiming otherwise.

Yet a more credible United States would receive a larger benefit of the doubt while the facts remained unknown. The strategic significance of the episode is therefore not what can currently be proven about the meeting. It is the environment in which the meeting is being interpreted. When an ally or observer sees unexplained American engagement with Moscow and instinctively wonders whether Washington is working around Europe rather than for it, a change has already occurred.

The greatest danger is not that the United States suddenly becomes powerless or that its alliances collapse. It is that credibility deteriorates incrementally while American material power remains sufficient to obscure the loss. Each individual departure appears survivable. Each contradiction becomes another news cycle. Each alliance dispute eventually moves off the front page. The system continues operating, and the new baseline gradually becomes ordinary.

Eventually, however, the United States will encounter a situation in which military capability alone cannot produce the necessary strategic effect. Washington will tell Moscow that an attack on NATO will trigger an American response, warn another adversary not to cross a particular line, ask an ally to accept extraordinary risk on the strength of an American guarantee, or sign an agreement whose effectiveness depends on the other side believing that the commitment will endure.

At that moment, the central question will not be whether America possesses the power to keep its word. It will be whether anyone believes that it will.

If the answer has become “prove it,” the credibility crisis will not have started at that moment. It will simply have been revealed. The deterioration will have taken place earlier, incrementally, while the deviations were becoming normal.

Sources and Citations

  1. Reuters, “US military transport plane lands in Moscow, Kremlin says it has no information yet,” August 25, 2026. Reporting confirmed the C-17 flight from Riga to Moscow and the absence of an initial public explanation for its purpose.
  2. Reuters, “US spy chief visits Russia for meetings, media reports,” August 25, 2026. Reporting confirmed CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s presence in Moscow for undisclosed meetings with Russian officials. (Reuters)
  3. Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, University of Chicago Press, 1996. See also Columbia Magazine’s discussion of Vaughan’s work on the Challenger disaster and the normalization of deviance.
  4. Pew Research Center, Richard Wike, Laura Silver, Moira Fagan, and Jonathan Schulman, “European views of Trump and the U.S. are especially negative,” June 23, 2026. Pew surveyed 42,151 adults in 36 countries between February 8 and May 13, 2026; Hungary and Poland were the only surveyed European countries where majorities considered the United States a reliable partner, while reliability ratings in eight others had fallen 28 to 52 percentage points. (Pew Research Center)
  5. NATO, “The Ankara Summit Declaration,” July 8, 2026. NATO’s 32 heads of state and government reaffirmed their “ironclad commitment” to collective defense under Article 5 and stated that “an attack on one is an attack on all.” (NATO)
  6. Reuters, “Trump: If NATO members don’t pay, US won’t defend them,” March 7, 2025. Trump stated that he would not defend allies he believed were failing to contribute sufficiently to defense. (Reuters)
  7. The Washington Post, “Pentagon abruptly cancels troop deployment to Europe amid frustrations with NATO,” May 15, 2026. The Pentagon halted the planned deployment of approximately 4,000 troops from the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, to Poland after personnel and equipment had already begun moving. (The Washington Post)
  8. The Washington Post, “Pentagon says U.S. will cut thousands of troops from Europe,” May 20, 2026. Reporting detailed the broader reduction of one of four U.S. brigade combat teams in Europe and the pause in a Texas-based brigade’s deployment to Poland. (The Washington Post)
  9. Associated Press, “From honey to hockey sticks, Trump’s trade war with Canada hikes tariffs on a long list of goods,” August 25, 2026. AP reported 50 percent U.S. tariffs on more than 550 Canadian products worth approximately $20 billion and Canada’s planned dollar-for-dollar retaliation. (AP News)
  10. Associated Press, “Canada strikes back at US with retaliatory tariffs as trade war escalates,” August 25, 2026. AP detailed Canadian retaliation, the economic effects on integrated North American supply chains, and the wider deterioration in U.S.-Canadian economic relations. (AP News)
  11. Reuters, “US, South Korea to cut length, scope of military drills after Trump order,” August 18, 2026. Reuters reported that Ulchi Freedom Shield would be reduced from eleven days to five and that field training would also be curtailed. (Reuters)
  12. Reuters, “Ukraine’s Zelenskiy sees window for U.S. mediation until summer 2027,” August 25, 2026. Zelenskyy linked the available diplomatic window partly to the timing of the 2028 U.S. presidential election and the possibility that it could alter American foreign-policy priorities. (Reuters)

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