We Already Paid for the Jammers. Why Aren’t We Using Them?
The United States spent billions of dollars developing electronic warfare systems to protect American forces from radio-controlled improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan. We developed the technology, trained the operators, refined the tactics, and accumulated substantial inventories of equipment. Today, as Ukraine struggles to counter Russian drones and American forces confront Iranian UAVs in the Middle East, thousands of Warlock and Duke jammers remain in American warehouses. Why aren’t we putting more of them to work?
This is not about replacing Patriot missiles or suggesting that electronic warfare can defeat every drone. It is about exploiting capabilities the United States already owns to reduce the number of threats requiring expensive kinetic interception. We have spent decades solving many of the underlying technical problems, yet appear to be approaching aspects of the counter-UAS challenge as though those previous investments never happened.
During the counter-IED campaigns, Warlock and Duke systems disrupted radio signals used to remotely detonate explosives. Their employment evolved to include directional electronic attack, electromagnetic deconfliction, and integration with friendly communications. Frequency-hopping radios and portable satellite communications helped American forces operate in environments where electronic interference was an everyday reality. These capabilities were developed and refined under combat conditions, not simply demonstrated in laboratories.
The relevance to modern drone warfare is straightforward. Many commercial and military-adapted drones rely on radio-frequency links for command and control. Interfering with those links can prevent an operator from directing an aircraft, potentially denying it the ability to complete its mission without physically destroying it. Autonomous aircraft and fiber-optic-controlled drones present different challenges, but neither changes the vulnerability of UAVs that remain dependent on radio communications.
The Department of Defense has already demonstrated the relationship between these technologies. The Navy’s DRAKE counter-UAS system draws on technology developed through the JCREW counter-IED program, while the Army demonstrated counter-UAS applications of Duke V3 in FY2025. The technical possibility of repurposing legacy electronic warfare capabilities is therefore established, even though the effectiveness of individual stored systems against contemporary UAVs would still need to be determined.
Having worked in counter-IED operations, I have personally seen warehouses containing thousands of Warlock and Duke systems. These were operational systems acquired at considerable expense and subsequently placed in storage. Their existence raises an obvious question about whether the Department of Defense has adequately examined the potential value of those inventories against a threat that has become central to modern warfare.
Consider the difference between Ukraine and the Middle East. Ukraine already employs electronic warfare extensively against Russian UAVs, making potentially useful American equipment an additional resource for an established defensive approach. American forces confronting Iranian drones face a different operational problem, including threats that may follow preprogrammed routes without continuous operator control. Yet both environments involve unmanned aircraft whose communications or navigation dependencies may be vulnerable to electronic disruption. The systems would need to be matched to those threats, but the possible applications are sufficiently relevant to warrant examination.
The economics are difficult to ignore. A modern air defense interceptor can cost hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars, while the drones it defeats may cost only a fraction of that amount. A reusable electronic warfare system offers the possibility of disrupting susceptible aircraft without expending an interceptor against each target. Although recovering and updating legacy equipment would not be free, the United States has already paid for the original hardware and much of the expertise required to operate it.
What makes this particularly striking is that the military continues developing new counter-UAS capabilities while possessing extensive inventories of equipment originally designed to disrupt radio-controlled threats. Some of those older systems may no longer be suitable, but others could retain useful capabilities or be adapted at relatively modest cost. The issue is not whether every jammer can be returned to service; it is whether the existing inventory has been systematically evaluated and exploited wherever doing so makes operational and financial sense.
That brings us to the unanswered question. How many Warlock and Duke systems remain in storage, what proportion could be useful against contemporary UAVs, and what has the Department of Defense done to determine their potential? More importantly, if suitable systems exist, why have they not been transferred or deployed more extensively to support Ukrainian forces and American personnel in the Middle East?
The United States invested decades in developing electronic warfare capabilities to defeat radio-controlled threats. Those investments produced equipment, operational expertise, and technological foundations that remain relevant to at least part of the contemporary UAV problem. The Pentagon has already demonstrated that related counter-IED technology can be adapted for counter-drone applications, making the status of its legacy inventories a legitimate matter of operational and fiscal accountability.
The question is not whether we need new counter-UAS technology. We do, because the threat continues to evolve. The question is why we would leave potentially useful equipment sitting in warehouses while spending additional billions confronting threats that some of those systems might help defeat.
We already identified the requirements, developed the capabilities, purchased the equipment, and learned how to employ it. Before treating every emerging threat as a requirement for another entirely new procurement program, we should establish whether existing resources can accomplish part of the mission.
If they can, why aren’t we using them?
Disclaimer
This publication provides independent, apolitical analysis of historical developments, current events, geopolitics, national security, and strategic challenges. We maintain strict political neutrality, aligning with neither the left nor the right. Examining or criticizing political actors, institutions, or policies does not constitute political advocacy, opposition, or endorsement.
Our assessments are grounded in historical facts, available evidence, established analytical methodologies, and evaluations of probability, consequence, and uncertainty. Hypothetical scenarios are illustrative and do not imply actual or planned events, intentions, or operations.
Our purpose is to identify, define, and understand problems—not to prescribe solutions or advocate outcomes. Conclusions reflect the available evidence, not political preferences. Decisions and actions remain the responsibility of others.