By, With, and Through: What Ukraine Can Learn From the War Against Daesh
The war in Ukraine raises an important question about how military operations are conducted, coordinated, and translated into strategic results. Nearly five years after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine continues to resist, Russia continues to occupy territory, and the international community continues to provide varying degrees of military, economic, and political assistance. Yet the relationship between these efforts and the larger strategic objective remains uncertain.
Two methodologies familiar to U.S. Army Special Forces offer a useful perspective: by, with, and through, and find, fix, and finish. The first has guided Green Berets for decades, emphasizing the ability to accomplish objectives through partner forces and complementary capabilities. The second, particularly within the broader F3EAD targeting cycle, connects intelligence, operational action, exploitation, and analysis.
The significance is not simply that these methodologies work individually. It is what becomes possible when they are employed together toward a common objective.
The Experience Against Daesh
In 2014, Daesh seized substantial territory in Iraq and Syria, imposed its own system of authority, and employed military force to maintain control. The resulting conflict involved more than destroying enemy formations. It required dismantling the organization’s ability to occupy and govern territory while enabling local forces to recover and retain control.
Operation Inherent Resolve employed a by, with, and through approach, integrating partner ground forces with coalition intelligence, surveillance, targeting, fires, logistics, and sustainment. Find, fix, and finish contributed to the identification and destruction of enemy capabilities, while exploitation and analysis informed subsequent operations. The combined methodology enabled military effects to support the recovery of territory rather than simply producing a succession of engagements.
By March 2019, Daesh had lost its remaining territorial enclave. The organization survived, but its territorial caliphate had been dismantled. This demonstrated how coordinated military capabilities could produce a defined strategic effect without necessarily eliminating every aspect of the adversary.
The Application to Ukraine
Russia’s invasion presents a different military and political environment, but the underlying territorial problem is recognizable. An aggressor has seized territory and attempted to establish control through military force. Ukraine’s objective is to preserve its sovereignty and recover occupied territory, while Russia seeks to maintain or expand its control.
Ukraine has demonstrated considerable proficiency in finding, fixing, and engaging Russian forces, particularly through the integration of unmanned systems, intelligence, and precision fires. However, the destruction of enemy personnel and equipment does not automatically produce territorial liberation. Russian forces can adapt, regenerate, and continue fighting, while Ukrainian forces must sustain the capacity to exploit tactical effects.
The larger distinction concerns the application of by, with, and through. Ukraine possesses substantial military capabilities, but its continued resistance also depends upon intelligence, industrial production, weapons, financing, logistics, and political relationships extending across numerous countries. These are complementary capabilities, but their existence does not necessarily mean they are being employed through a unified methodology toward a clearly understood strategic objective.
During the campaign against Daesh, the relationship between targeting, partner capabilities, and territorial recovery was an essential part of the operational approach. In Ukraine, military assistance has been substantial, but its individual components remain influenced by different national priorities, authorities, restrictions, and political objectives.
The consequence is a distinction between providing Ukraine with the means to continue fighting and collectively employing available capabilities to achieve a defined strategic effect.
The Broader Strategic Problem
The relevance of these methodologies extends beyond intelligence, targeting, and military operations. Russia’s ability to sustain the invasion depends upon industrial production, financing, logistics, political authority, manpower, technological adaptation, and international relationships. Ukraine’s ability to resist depends upon many of the same elements, including substantial external support.
A broader application of find, fix, and finish would begin by understanding which relationships and capabilities sustain the adversary’s objectives. By, with, and through would then concern how the capabilities of different participants could be brought together to influence those conditions. Exploitation and analysis would determine whether the resulting effects were producing meaningful changes or whether the adversary was successfully adapting.
This is fundamentally different from measuring success through weapons deliveries, casualties, equipment losses, or individual territorial changes. Those measurements remain relevant, but their strategic importance depends upon whether they alter the conditions necessary for the adversary to continue pursuing its objectives.
The campaign against Daesh demonstrated the value of connecting complementary capabilities to a defined territorial outcome. Ukraine demonstrates the complexity of applying those principles against a state capable of sustaining prolonged military operations through national resources and external relationships.
The Strategic Implication
The central question is not whether the methodologies developed through special operations can simply be transferred to another conflict. It is whether the relationships between objectives, capabilities, operations, and effects are being understood and employed at the appropriate level.
Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to fight, adapt, and impose substantial costs on Russian forces. Its international supporters have demonstrated the capacity to provide significant resources. What remains uncertain is whether these capabilities are collectively changing the conditions necessary to end Russian territorial aggression.
The distinction between tactical activity and strategic effect is fundamental. Find, fix, and finish can generate military results. By, with, and through can leverage capabilities that extend beyond any individual force or country. Their value lies in connecting those capabilities and results to the objective being pursued.
The war in Ukraine is therefore not simply a test of weapons, technology, manpower, or national endurance. It is also a test of whether distributed military, economic, political, and institutional capabilities can be employed coherently enough to produce a lasting strategic outcome.
The lesson from special operations is straightforward: the objective determines the methodology, the methodology organizes the capabilities, and the resulting effects determine whether the objective is being achieved.
Disclaimer
This publication provides independent, apolitical analysis of historical developments, current events, geopolitics, national security, and strategic challenges. We maintain strict political neutrality, aligning with neither the left nor the right. Examining or criticizing political actors, institutions, or policies does not constitute political advocacy, opposition, or endorsement. Our assessments are grounded in historical facts, available evidence, established analytical methodologies, and evaluations of probability, consequence, and uncertainty. Hypothetical scenarios are illustrative and do not imply actual or planned events, intentions, or operations. Our purpose is to identify, define, and understand problems—not to prescribe solutions or advocate outcomes. Conclusions reflect the available evidence, not political preferences. Decisions and actions remain the responsibility of others.