Missing the Point: Strategy, Methodology, and the Language of Special Operations
Our recent article, “By, With, and Through: What Ukraine Can Learn From the War Against Daesh,” generated an interesting response from a reader on Medium. The commentary raised several questions about Ukraine’s strategic objectives, Russia’s military capabilities, and the applicability of lessons from counterterrorism operations to conventional warfare. Although these observations were not necessarily incorrect, they illustrated a recurring problem in analytical discussions: the difference between disagreeing with an argument and misunderstanding what the argument actually says.
The original article was not intended to compare Russia with Daesh, suggest that Ukraine could replicate the campaign against Daesh, or propose an overarching strategy for defeating Russia. It examined the operational methodologies employed in special operations and considered how those principles might inform Ukraine’s ability to integrate capabilities and generate meaningful effects. The distinction is important because the criticism focused largely on issues the article never attempted to address.
Our argument was about operational methodology. Specifically, we examined how military, intelligence, and other capabilities can be integrated to produce meaningful effects in support of strategic objectives. “By, With, and Through” describes an approach to working with and enabling partner forces. “Find, Fix, Finish” describes a process for identifying, locating, and acting against targets. Neither constitutes a national strategy, and neither was presented as a substitute for one. They are methods of organizing and executing operations, not prescriptions for determining political objectives.
The distinction matters because military organizations frequently confuse activity with progress. Destroying targets, delivering weapons, conducting operations, and generating impressive statistics may demonstrate effort without establishing whether that effort is producing the intended effect. The relevant question is not simply what was accomplished, but what changed as a consequence. That was the central argument of the original article: operational success must be measured against the effects it produces, not merely the activity it generates.
The Medium commentary challenged the relevance of comparing operations against Daesh with a war against a nuclear-armed state possessing an industrial base, conventional military capabilities, and strategic depth. It also questioned Ukraine’s political endgame, the sustainability of its military effort, and whether supplying weapons and destroying targets could constitute a coherent strategy. These are legitimate subjects for discussion, and several of the underlying observations are entirely reasonable. However, they do not directly challenge the operational methodologies examined in our article.
We were not suggesting that the campaign against Daesh could be reproduced against Russia, nor were we equating the two adversaries. We were examining methodologies developed and refined through operational experience and considering their relevance to the integration of capabilities in Ukraine. Confusing a discussion of methodology with an attempt to prescribe grand strategy changes the subject rather than challenging the argument.
This also explains our terminology. We use the language of special operations because that is where our professional experience originates. Terms such as “By, With, and Through,” “Find, Fix, Finish,” targeting cycles, operational effects, and mission integration are not rhetorical flourishes intended to make an argument sound more sophisticated. They are the professional vocabulary through which we learned to understand, plan, execute, and evaluate operations. We use that vocabulary because it accurately describes the concepts under examination.
Special operations terminology is not inherently restricted to counterterrorism, nor does its use imply that every conflict should be approached as a special operations mission. The underlying principles of partner-force integration, intelligence-driven targeting, coordination across capabilities, and effects-based assessment have relevance beyond the environments in which particular methodologies were developed. Their application must reflect the circumstances, but the principles do not become irrelevant simply because the adversary or character of the conflict changes.
There is a broader analytical problem here. It is entirely possible to make factually correct observations while drawing conclusions that have little relationship to the argument being examined. The distinction between factual accuracy and analytical relevance is significant. An observation about Russia’s nuclear arsenal may be accurate. A question about Ukraine’s political objectives may be important. Neither, by itself, establishes that a discussion of operational methodology is flawed.
Our purpose at QQSI is not to substitute terminology for analysis or tactical activity for strategy. It is to examine how systems operate, how capabilities interact, and whether the effects produced correspond to the objectives they are intended to support. That requires distinguishing between what an organization does, how it does it, and why those actions matter.
Disagreement is useful when it challenges an argument on its merits. But before an argument can be challenged meaningfully, it must first be understood. Otherwise, the discussion becomes an examination of questions the original article never attempted to answer, while the actual argument remains untouched.
Disclaimer
This publication provides independent, apolitical analysis of historical developments, current events, geopolitics, national security, and strategic challenges. We maintain strict political neutrality, aligning with neither the left nor the right. Examining or criticizing political actors, institutions, or policies does not constitute political advocacy, opposition, or endorsement.
Our assessments are grounded in historical facts, available evidence, established analytical methodologies, and evaluations of probability, consequence, and uncertainty. Hypothetical scenarios are illustrative and do not imply actual or planned events, intentions, or operations.
Our purpose is to identify, define, and understand problems—not to prescribe solutions or advocate outcomes. Conclusions reflect the available evidence, not political preferences. Decisions and actions remain the responsibility of others.