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Europe Is Not Trump’s to Negotiate Away

November 14, 2026 Contextual Intelligence

Donald Trump and his representatives are treating decades of European agreements as though Washington and Moscow have the authority to renegotiate them without the countries that negotiated and accepted them. The latest talks with Vladimir Putin expose a fundamental breach of trust that extends beyond America’s willingness to defend its allies. Washington is entertaining negotiations over commitments it has no authority to rewrite on its own. The United States helped establish the framework for European stability, but it does not own it.

During negotiations in Abu Dhabi on November 10–11, Russia elevated the restructuring of European security to a central negotiating objective. Vladimir Medinsky, Russia’s chief negotiator, explicitly questioned the arrangements established after Yalta and Potsdam and called for a comprehensive new framework. American representatives entertained that discussion while European governments remained excluded from direct negotiations with Moscow. Jared Kushner subsequently traveled to Moscow with Steve Witkoff to seek Putin’s approval for European participation. The irony is extraordinary. Two American presidential envoys went to Moscow seeking Putin’s approval for America’s own allies to participate in discussions about agreements those allies helped establish. Their approach raises serious questions about their understanding of the diplomatic framework they have been entrusted to negotiate. Sources: Euronews, November 11–12; Reuters, November 12.

The agreements at issue were never Washington’s to renegotiate alone. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act established fundamental principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 1994 Budapest agreements reaffirmed those principles, established the basis for the OSCE, and included Russia’s assurances to respect Ukraine’s borders. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act explicitly denied Moscow any veto over NATO decisions. Russia helped negotiate and accepted these commitments alongside other governments. Yet Kushner and Witkoff are pursuing discussions in which Moscow is being consulted about whether those same governments should participate. The contradiction should have been obvious before either envoy arrived at the negotiating table. Sources: OSCE, Helsinki Final Act and Budapest Summit; NATO, 1997 Founding Act.

Putin’s objectives are not new. Russia has repeatedly sought restrictions on NATO enlargement and military deployments in Eastern Europe, including through its rejected proposals in 2021. European governments have consistently maintained that Russia cannot dictate their defense arrangements. That position was reaffirmed on November 12, when French President Emmanuel Macron insisted that Europeans would determine their own future security, while other European leaders rejected Moscow’s attempt to reopen the established framework. The European position remains substantially unchanged. What has changed is Washington’s willingness to entertain Moscow’s demands. Source: Euronews, November 12.

The conduct of Kushner and Witkoff deserves particular scrutiny because the problem is not merely diplomatic protocol. By seeking Putin’s consent to European participation, they risk granting Moscow procedural influence over negotiations in which it has no authority to exclude the affected governments. Even if their intention is to encourage Russian cooperation, the approach risks confusing a negotiating tactic with a legitimate decision-making process. Experienced diplomacy requires understanding which concessions are available to negotiate and which decisions belong to other governments. This episode raises questions about whether Trump’s representatives appreciate that distinction.

This is precisely the problem we identified in our earlier analysis of the normalization of American unreliability. European governments have spent decades treating Washington as their principal strategic partner. They now face an administration whose representatives are discussing matters that directly affect Europe’s defense while treating European participation as a negotiating concession to be obtained from Putin. An unreliable ally might fail to honor its commitments during a crisis. An ally that negotiates over your future without your participation creates a different problem: its diplomacy can become a source of strategic uncertainty rather than reassurance.

The negotiations also demonstrate our recurring distinction between producing an output and achieving a strategic effect. Trump may eventually secure a ceasefire in Ukraine and announce another diplomatic victory. But ending the immediate fighting is not the same as establishing lasting peace. A settlement between Washington and Moscow that disregards the positions of Ukraine and other European governments would leave the underlying disputes unresolved. It could produce an American declaration of success without producing an agreement that the affected countries consider acceptable or sustainable. The distinction is between securing a diplomatic announcement and achieving a durable strategic outcome.

The consequences extend beyond the negotiating table. European governments are increasing defense spending, reinforcing vulnerable borders, and reconsidering their dependence on American guarantees. Much of this activity responds directly to Russian aggression, but uncertainty about American reliability increasingly influences those decisions. The current negotiations reinforce the concern that Europe must prepare not only for threats from Moscow but also for American decisions made without adequate regard for European interests. Once that uncertainty becomes embedded in European defense planning, the damage to transatlantic confidence will outlast the administration responsible for it.

Putin does not need to persuade Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, or the rest of Europe to accept his demands to benefit from the situation. He can continue pressing those demands while Washington entertains discussions that European governments have already rejected. Nor does he need to dismantle NATO to exploit uncertainty about American intentions. A transatlantic relationship weakened by conflicting diplomatic objectives creates opportunities for Moscow even if no comprehensive agreement emerges. The negotiations themselves can therefore have strategic consequences independent of their stated purpose.

For the United States, those consequences are considerably more serious than another disagreement among allies. Alliances depend upon military capabilities, treaty obligations, and confidence that participating governments will respect their commitments to one another. The Trump administration’s approach raises doubts about the third element at precisely the moment Europe is reassessing the first two. American military power remains formidable, but military capabilities cannot compensate for deteriorating political confidence among governments that must make long-term decisions about their own defense.

The United States cannot simply renegotiate decades of European agreements because Trump believes he can make a deal with Putin. The governments that negotiated and accepted those commitments retain their own rights and responsibilities, and any meaningful revision requires their participation and consent. A bilateral understanding between Washington and Moscow cannot substitute for agreement among the countries whose interests would be affected. Europe is not an American possession to be traded away in pursuit of a diplomatic achievement.

That is the significance of the November negotiations and the broader pattern we have been examining for months. Russia’s demands have not fundamentally changed, and Europe has not abandoned its opposition to them. The change is in Washington, where Trump has entrusted consequential diplomacy to representatives whose approach raises questions about their grasp of the agreements and relationships involved. The irony is that the United States, which helped establish these arrangements and spent generations defending them, is now entertaining discussions that call its commitment to them into question. Europe already knows what to expect from Putin. The increasingly consequential uncertainty concerns what it can expect from the United States.

Disclaimer

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Our assessments are grounded in historical facts, available evidence, established analytical methodologies, and evaluations of probability, consequence, and uncertainty. Hypothetical scenarios are illustrative and do not imply actual or planned events, intentions, or operations.

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