The Expertise Paradox: What Central and Eastern Europe’s Defence Industry May Be Missing
Central and Eastern Europe is investing heavily in military technology and industrial capacity. But building defence equipment and developing effective military capabilities are not the same thing. The distinction raises an important question about the expertise guiding the region’s defence-industrial expansion.
Central and Eastern Europe is undergoing a significant defence-industrial transformation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s strengthened eastern flank, and growing concerns about European defence readiness have accelerated investment in military manufacturing, technology, infrastructure, and industrial partnerships. Governments are committing resources to developing capabilities that have become increasingly important to national and collective security.
The transformation is not uniform. Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechia, Slovakia, and the Baltic states possess different industrial foundations, military requirements, financial resources, and national priorities. Some are expanding established industries, while others are developing new manufacturing relationships or acquiring capabilities through international partnerships. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has documented the different approaches emerging across the region, including the importance of industrial cooperation and the development of domestic production capacity.
Yet behind the investment figures, manufacturing agreements, and announcements of new technology sits a more fundamental question: are these organizations developing the capabilities their military customers actually need, or are they primarily expanding their capacity to produce equipment?
The distinction matters because technical performance does not automatically translate into operational effectiveness. And in a region facing urgent defence requirements, misunderstanding that distinction carries consequences.
The Knowledge Behind the Capability
Across NATO, there is an existing pool of military professionals whose experience extends across decades of multinational operations, capability development, training, and the integration of military systems. Some have spent 20 or 30 years working within intelligence, targeting, special operations, communications, electronic warfare, joint fires, and operational planning. Their professional knowledge has been developed through repeated exposure to complex military problems, organizational limitations, evolving technologies, and the practical consequences of operational decisions.
This is not an argument that military veterans are automatically subject matter experts. Rank, time in service, and deployments are not reliable substitutes for demonstrating relevant knowledge. Experience must be evaluated against the specific capability being developed, and lessons from previous conflicts cannot simply be transferred to contemporary European warfare without examining their applicability.
Nevertheless, genuine operational expertise represents a form of institutional knowledge that cannot be produced simply by purchasing technology, opening a manufacturing facility, or expanding an engineering workforce. It is acquired through understanding how military organizations operate, how their capabilities interact, and why systems that perform successfully in isolation sometimes fail when introduced into operational environments.
For Central and Eastern European defence companies developing products intended for NATO forces, this knowledge can be particularly relevant. Multinational interoperability is not simply a matter of complying with technical standards. It involves understanding organizational structures, command relationships, communications, operational procedures, training requirements, and the dependencies that determine whether a capability can produce its intended effect.
A company may possess the engineering knowledge necessary to build a system without possessing all the operational knowledge necessary to understand how that system must function. These are different requirements, and neither can automatically substitute for the other.
The Difference Between Equipment and Capability
Consider the development of a counter-unmanned aircraft system. A manufacturer may focus on detection range, tracking accuracy, engagement performance, reliability, and the technical characteristics of its components. Those measurements are essential to evaluating the equipment, but they do not independently establish the effectiveness of the defensive capability.
Operational employment introduces additional requirements. Detection must support identification, information must reach the appropriate decision-makers, engagement authority must be established, and the system must function alongside friendly forces and other defensive capabilities. Communications may be disrupted, intelligence may be incomplete, and operational conditions may differ considerably from those anticipated during testing.
A system can therefore satisfy its technical specifications while remaining unsuitable for the organization expected to employ it.
The same distinction applies to intelligence architectures, unmanned platforms, tactical communications, targeting systems, and other military technologies. Their effectiveness depends on relationships between equipment, personnel, doctrine, training, logistics, command structures, and the operational environment.
Understanding those relationships is essential to capability development. It requires identifying what effect must be achieved, what capabilities are necessary to produce that effect, which capabilities already exist, how resilient those capabilities are, and what dependencies or gaps remain.
These questions should precede decisions about additional equipment or resources. Otherwise, organizations risk treating a proposed technical solution as evidence that they have correctly understood the operational problem.
The result can be a technologically impressive product that contributes less to military effectiveness than its specifications suggest.
A Structural Blind Spot
Defence companies understandably recruit against identifiable organizational requirements. They need engineers, software developers, production specialists, program managers, technical personnel, and commercial professionals. These functions are essential to developing and delivering military equipment.
However, a recruitment system organized around conventional positions may struggle to recognize expertise that crosses several functional boundaries.
An operational specialist may understand military requirements, training, testing, interoperability, operational concepts, and the practical integration of systems without fitting neatly into an engineering or management position. Their contribution may involve identifying weaknesses in a proposed capability, evaluating the assumptions behind technical requirements, or explaining how a product must interact with other military systems.
That expertise is not always easily represented through a conventional job description.
This creates a potential structural blind spot. An organization may be capable of recruiting the personnel necessary to manufacture a product while failing to identify the additional knowledge necessary to ensure that the product delivers its intended operational effect.
The problem is not necessarily that companies refuse to employ experienced operators. Many defence manufacturers maintain military advisory relationships, employ veterans, involve military customers in development, and conduct operational testing. The more important issue is whether operational knowledge is sufficiently integrated into the decisions that shape requirements, design, testing, and employment.
The absence of a particular job title tells us little. The absence of a necessary capability within the organization would tell us considerably more.
The Foreign Expertise Question
Central and Eastern Europe’s defence industries operate within national security frameworks that impose legitimate restrictions on foreign participation. Citizenship requirements, security clearances, export controls, contractual obligations, and the protection of sensitive technologies can limit who may work on particular programs.
These restrictions are necessary in appropriate circumstances. However, they do not apply uniformly to every function within defence capability development.
Operational requirements analysis, training development, certain forms of testing, interoperability assessment, and unclassified advisory work may be performed without access to classified information or restricted technologies, depending on national regulations and the specific program.
Foreign specialists may nevertheless face additional obstacles involving language, professional networks, recognition of qualifications, employment practices, and uncertainty about their suitability for positions within nationally oriented defence organizations.
The European Commission has identified skills shortages as a challenge to defence-industrial development and has acknowledged the constraints that citizenship and security requirements can impose on international workforce mobility. These findings establish a broader workforce problem, although they do not demonstrate systematic exclusion of experienced foreign military professionals by Central and Eastern European companies.
The significance lies in the potential mismatch between available expertise and organizational access to it.
NATO has spent decades developing multinational interoperability through combined operations, common standards, joint training, and the exchange of military knowledge. Experienced personnel from allied nations may therefore possess precisely the practical understanding needed to support companies developing products for multinational military environments.
Their nationality does not automatically establish their suitability, just as foreign nationality does not automatically make their expertise irrelevant.
The question is whether regional defence companies are identifying the knowledge required for their programs and distinguishing genuine security restrictions from other barriers that may prevent access to qualified specialists.
The Cost of Relearning Existing Lessons
Central and Eastern Europe faces a time-sensitive defence challenge. Industrial expansion is occurring alongside changing military requirements, rapid technological development, and continuing lessons from the war in Ukraine. Manufacturing capacity is necessary, but the urgency of the security environment also places a premium on ensuring that new equipment becomes usable military capability.
This makes the treatment of existing operational knowledge particularly important.
When a capability is developed around incomplete operational assumptions, the consequences can extend throughout the program. An overlooked interoperability requirement may influence technical design, which affects testing, training, procurement, and integration with existing systems. Correcting that omission later may require additional resources and delay operational availability.
These are potential cascading failures. An early misunderstanding generates dependencies that become increasingly expensive to resolve as development progresses.
Experienced operational specialists do not eliminate these risks. Their knowledge may be incomplete, outdated, or poorly suited to emerging threats. Engineers, scientists, military customers, and operational users must evaluate requirements together, with assumptions subjected to testing rather than accepted on the basis of professional credentials.
The value of relevant experience is that it can introduce knowledge acquired through previous operational problems before those problems are unnecessarily repeated.
This has particular significance for an industry seeking to accelerate capability development. Organizations can invest in equipment, manufacturing facilities, and new technical personnel, but they cannot instantly reproduce decades of accumulated operational knowledge.
Domestic expertise must continue to develop, and long-term sovereign capability depends on it. Yet using qualified allied specialists where appropriate is not inherently inconsistent with that objective. Knowledge transferred into domestic institutions can contribute to their development rather than replace it.
The critical issue is whether existing expertise is recognized as a capability-development resource or treated as something separate from the industrial process.
The Difference Between Industrial Growth and Military Readiness
Defence-industrial expansion is often measured through investment, employment, production capacity, technology transfers, contracts, and delivery schedules. These indicators matter because military capabilities cannot be sustained without industrial capacity, technical competence, and reliable supply chains.
But they measure only part of the requirement.
A factory’s output does not independently establish the operational effectiveness of its products. Meeting technical specifications does not guarantee interoperability. Delivering equipment on schedule does not demonstrate that military organizations can employ it effectively under contested conditions.
Military readiness depends on the relationship between equipment and the organizations expected to use it. Doctrine, training, personnel, logistics, command structures, operational integration, and organizational resilience must support the intended effect.
This is where the distinction between industrial growth and capability development becomes decisive.
The European defence-industrial workforce challenges identified by the European Commission are genuine, as are the differing approaches to industrial development documented across Central and Eastern Europe. But there is insufficient public evidence to conclude that regional manufacturers systematically exclude foreign operational experts or that their workforces generally lack military experience.
The absence of that evidence does not eliminate the analytical question. It defines what remains unknown.
Do these organizations possess the operational knowledge necessary to understand their customers’ requirements? Is that knowledge incorporated early enough to influence development decisions? Are military end users involved in evaluating dependencies and failure conditions? And are recruitment and organizational structures capable of recognizing relevant expertise that falls outside conventional technical positions?
These questions matter regardless of whether the expertise is provided by domestic personnel, foreign NATO veterans, active military users, or established advisory teams.
The Expertise Paradox
Central and Eastern Europe’s defence-industrial development is strategically important, but investment alone cannot establish the effectiveness of the capabilities being produced. The region’s different national industries must translate financial resources, technical knowledge, manufacturing capacity, and operational requirements into military capabilities that function reliably within their intended environments.
That requires more than engineering and production. It requires an understanding of the effects military organizations need to achieve, the capabilities necessary to achieve them, and the dependencies that can prevent success.
Experienced operational specialists can contribute to that understanding, including those whose expertise was developed over decades of multinational NATO operations. Whether regional defence companies are fully utilizing this knowledge remains an open question deserving examination rather than assumption.
The strategic concern is not that every company must employ more veterans or foreign specialists. It is that an organization can become increasingly capable of manufacturing military equipment without developing an equivalent understanding of how that equipment must be employed.
In an environment where time, resources, and military readiness carry significant consequences, that gap can become expensive.
Central and Eastern Europe is investing heavily in the capabilities it believes it needs. The measure of success will not simply be what its defence industries can build, but whether those products produce the required military effects.
The expertise required to understand that difference already exists in many forms, including decades of accumulated operational experience across NATO.
The question is whether the organizations responsible for building the next generation of military capabilities recognize where that knowledge matters.
References
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Defence of Europe in a New Era: An Assessment — Chapter Two: The Emerging Defence-industrial Ecosystem in Central and Eastern Europe. September 16, 2026.
NATO. Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank. Updated September 29, 2026.
https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/strengthening-natos-eastern-flank
European Commission. Defence Industry Transformation Roadmap. 2025.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0845
European Commission. 2026 European Macroeconomic Report. Published November 25, 2025.
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